The Chosen One:
How Social Accountability makes certain Descriptive Representatives More Preferable

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Abstract

What considerations do individuals use when choosing to support certain descriptive representatives over others? Like many scholars, I investigate the descriptive representation model through the lens of Black political behavior. In this article, I provide a mechanism that explains why Black voters choose certain candidates over others by demonstrating that Blacks prefer descriptive representatives who, through signaling, show a prioritization of the Black community's political interests over their own individual interests. In two experiments with 1,150 Black respondents each, I vary the kind of signals Black and White candidates use finding that Blacks prefer a candidate who shows they have put the group's interest above self-interest through signals of personal sacrifice for the group. These findings not only have strong implications for the way we understand Black political behavior, they provide a framework through which scholars can investigate the descriptive representation model for other groups.

Word Count: 9, 566

Research on descriptive representation—particularly that on Black Americans—finds positive responses to being represented by descriptive representatives, including changes in political engagement and perceptions of the representatives (Swain 1993; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 2004; Griffin and Keene 2006; Broockman 2014; Stout 2015). Is descriptive representation—constituents and representatives sharing a salient identity or demographic characteristic—fundamentally about being a represented by "someone who looks like me"? Do voters prefer descriptive representatives because they share similar lived experiences (Pitkin 1967; Griffiths 1960; Mansbridge 1999; Dovi 2002)? Is the simple explanation, found often in public discourse, for this preference among Black voters—"because they are Black"—sufficient?

Recent developments in Black politics, I argue, make it clear that the current model of descriptive representation is insufficient. Neither supporting representatives "because they are Black" nor sharing lived experiences can explain how Black voters choose between multiple descriptive representatives in primary elections, nor why Black voters have diverged from their presumed preference for descriptive representatives in recent elections. For example, despite the possibility of being the first Black governor of Maryland, a heavily Democratic state with a large and politically influential Black population, both Anthony Brown and Benjamin Jealous lost their respective gubernatorial races due, in large part, to levels of Black support that were lower than expected (Wagner and Craighill 2014; Chason 2018). Moreover, existing frameworks cannot explain why Memphis Representative Steve Cohen, a White politician, has been able to garner and maintain Black support in his majority Black district despite being challenged by well-known and viable Black candidates (Brown 2009). Though we know much about the relationship between Black voters and Black representatives, the remaining inability to explain why Black voters prefer some representatives over others underscores the need to better understand the mechanisms that generate constituents' support for certain descriptive representatives.

In this article, I argue that voters' preferences for descriptive representation rest not simply on commonalities of skin color nor assumptions of similarities in lived experiences, but on assessments of a candidate's likely accountability to the descriptive group. I assess this argument by looking at the descriptive representation model through the lens of Black political behavior. Black Americans are an optimal case for assessing the mechanisms that underlie preferences for descriptive representation. High levels of group solidarity in social and political arenas (Gurin et al. 1990; Dawson 1994; White et al. 2014), strong desire for political inclusion (Walton 1985; Gurin et al 1990; Dawson 1994), and appreciation for seeing a co-racial representative in office (Tate 2004; Simien 2015) all suggest that Black voters should be pre-disposed to support Black candidates. If, as I expect, Blacks' preferences for descriptive representatives are dependent upon signals beyond descriptive group membership that candidates provide—if among the most coherent political group membership is not enough—then the need for such a framework to assess preferences for descriptive representatives among voters from other groups who have less cohesion on social and political dimensions (i.e. women, Latinx voters) is rendered particularly clear.

I pull together the work of Ismail White and colleagues (2014; N.D.) on the effects of social accountability on Black political behavior with the descriptive representation literature, to build what I term *community commitment signaling framework*. Black voters, I argue, prefer politicians who use signals that cue their social accountability within the Black community to place the racial group's political interests above their own in order to better the group's position in politics. Some of these signals convey that the politician has already placed the group's interest above his own, while others convey the possibility that the politician is likely to pay social costs for failure to put the group's interest first. I discuss how this framework simultaneously explains the particular political appeal of Civil Rights Movement leaders in Black electoral politics and the potential of White candidates to be more desirable than some Black representatives. I demonstrate the effectiveness of the two types of

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community commitments signals across two experiments, wherein I vary, first, the signals a Black politician uses to communicate his social accountability to the Black community, and then do the same for a White politician. The results of the experiments show that Black voters strongly prefer politicians that can show, through signals where the candidates' physical well-being is compromised, that they have already placed the group's interests above their own in attempts to better the political position of the group. Importantly, Black voters recognize that all descriptive representatives are not the same, and use their perceptions of a politician's willingness to put the group's interests first to determine the optimal descriptive representative.

Providing a mechanism that explains Black voters' preference for certain Black candidates provides a unique and strong contribution to the study of democratic representation broadly by offering a first-look into the criterion used by voters, outside of nominal matching on race and partisanship, to choose which candidates they prefer. This work also contributes to the study of descriptive representation given the pervasive claims within political science and public discourse about the strong preference Black voters have for Black candidates. It is imperative that we have answers to what considerations are being made by Black voters as the number of Black representatives running for higher offices (i.e., Senate and the Presidency) increases (Chinni and Bronston 2018; Lublin 2018). Furthermore, employing a second experimental test to further support the results of the first using a White candidate towards whom Black voters, scholarship tells us, have more negative feelings offers even stronger evidence of the social accountability mechanism that explains why Black voters view certain candidates more positively than others.

Descriptive Representation: Finding The Mechanism

Existing work tells us that when represented by a descriptive representative, Black voters are more communicative with their representative (Broockman 2014) and experience increases in political knowledge, empowerment, and willingness to engage the political system (Bobo and Gilliam

1990; Swain 1993; Lublin 1999; Tate 2004; Griffin and Keene 2006; Stout 2015). Specifically, Katherine Tate (2004) suggests that Black voters' strong preference for Black politicians stems from the perception that they are more trustworthy, helpful, and hand-on in the community than White representatives. These findings, while informative, are established using observational data that was collected after the representatives were elected into office. This reality makes it difficult to ascertain whether the affective attachments and perceptions of Black voters have are why they supported their representatives, or if these perceptions were established after she was voted into office.

While this endogeneity issue makes establishing and testing the mechanisms at work in the existing descriptive representation literature difficult to isolate, some important works have laid the groundwork for understanding what may make certain representatives more preferable to Black voters. Dovi (2002) theorizes preferable Black descriptive representatives are those that are seen as "one of us," but I contend that the notion of being "one of us" is not zero-sum, and understanding the nuances within group based appeals is necessary to understand voter preferability. Stout (2015) takes up this mantle and assesses different kinds of racialized finding that Black voters prefer candidates who rely on positive racial appeals (those that do not deride an opponent's racial identity). Despite his informative findings, he offers little explanation for why these appeals are more successful or how variation even within positive appeals might affect how Black candidates are evaluated. Canon (1999) alludes to the fact that Black civil rights politicians are preferred by Black voters more than their younger more coalitional counterparts, but does not explain why traditional Black leaders are preferred. Some might suggest turning to policy to find a mechanism. Though policy preferences are often studied to understand how representatives are viewed, most evaluations of descriptive representatives occur in low information environments where knowledge of bills passed is minimal (Tate 2004; Griffin and Flavin 2007), and policy is among the lowest priorities for many Black voters (Cain et al 1987; Fenno 2003; Cohen 2003; Tate 2004). Thus, investigating policy

as a mechanism does not offer strong evidence of changes in Blacks' evaluations of co-racial candidates.

As such, I look to other aspects of Black political behavior to establish a mechanism that may explain the political calculus employed by Black voters when choosing Black representatives. I turn to contemporary research about how perceptions of social accountability, or placing the group's political interests above one's own individual interests, can alter the behaviors of Black voters in electoral and social settings (White et al. 2014). Much of this new research is focused on how social accountability and social sanctions constrain the behaviors of Black Americans, but I believe it can help explain and predict the dynamics within the existing descriptive representation model. Understanding the ways Blacks have and continue to use social accountability to ensure group cohesion is a fruitful place to investigate Black political considerations of candidates, and can give us some direction as to how to address similar causal dilemmas with other politically marginalized populations.

Social Accountability: The Missing Mechanism?

Civil Rights Leaders & Social Accountability

Given that most politically marginalized groups' political behaviors are born out of their history of exclusion and discrimination (Dawson 1994; Masuoka 2006, Sanchez and Masuoka 2010), I look to the historical narrative of Black Americans to understand how it might determine the kinds of descriptive representatives they prefer. Black Americans' historical exclusion from mainstream political and social arenas led to the development of unique social and political structures within the Black community that were used to ensure group cohesion (Walton 1985; Gurin et al 1989; Dawson 1994). Many within the Black community believed presenting a united front to those with the power to change their political circumstance would be more effective, and thus relied on social sanctions, such as public ridicule and stereotypes to enforce the prioritization of the group's socio-political

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needs above one's individual needs (Walton 1985; White et al. 2014). This mentality is epitomized in the actions of activists and leaders of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. The willingness of many individuals to participate in protests ranging from boycotts and sit-ins to marches that, in some cases, resulted in bodily harm or imprisonment showed a prioritization of the racial group's social and political inclusion of above their own individual well-being.

The post 1960s Civil Rights Movement era ushered in new opportunities for Blacks to participate in politics both as voters, and for many of the movement's leaders, formal elected officials (Canon 1999; Tate 2004; Gillespie 2010). I contend that Black voter's preference for civil rights politicians stems from the strong association between Civil Rights leaders' sacrifices and the Black community's social accountability structure. The 1969 Negro Survey tells us that when asked, *"Do you think the methods the civil rights leaders use, like marches, picketing, and demonstrations, are helping or hurting the cause?"* Seventy-four percent of the 977 self-identified Black Americans felt that those methods helped, which shows that protesting and marching were viewed positively (Newsweek/Gallup 1969). Since many of the first Black politicians post-Reconstruction were leaders in the Civil Rights Movement, I contend that their leadership styles left an indelible imprint on the hearts and minds of Black people. In turn, they prefer co-racial representatives who resemble civil rights' politicians.[1]

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[1] While some might argue that in his presidential bids, Obama did not behave in ways that support these claims, it is important not to underestimate the novelty of his candidacy, and the subsequent alterations many within the Black community may have made to have the first Black president elected. See the "wink and nod agreement" discussed in Harris (2012).

Community Commitment Signaling

If, as I expect, the characteristics and behaviors typified by civil rights leaders are what make certain Black descriptive representatives more preferable to Black voters, how might post-civil rights politicians take advantage of this leadership style? I argue that those politicians without backgrounds in the movement have to show that they already have, or are likely to, place the group's interests above their own through signals of commitment to the Black community. These signals generally manifest in rhetoric used by representatives but can also be found in writings about them (i.e., newspaper articles or website biographies). Given that research suggests that Black individuals have a strong preference for representatives with roots in the Civil Rights Movement (Canon 1999), I extrapolate aspects of civil rights leaders' behaviors to better understand how other representatives might emulate these behaviors in their own appeals to Black voters.[2] Two staple characteristics of civil rights leaders were their strong social connections to the Black community and the personal sacrifices they made for the betterment of the racial group (Chong 1999; Williams 2007). My contention is that Black descriptive representatives' commitment signals should mimic those characteristics and rely on their personal sacrifices and/or social connections to the racial group.[3]

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[2] To be clear, these actions are not only found in those individuals who participated in the Civil Rights Movement, but rather are epitomized by those women and men.

[3] To be sure, these two kinds of community commitment signals are strategically employed and thus not mutually exclusive. Indeed, politicians who display sacrifice are likely to have strong social connections to the Black community, which informs their desire to make personal sacrifices. However, it may not be politically efficacious to do so and thus she may rely on social connections instead.

These signals, however, will lead to variation in perceptions of a politician's accountability and subsequently Black voters' evaluations of the candidate.

Community Commitment Signals & Social Accountability

Politicians signal personal sacrifice when a they demonstrate a prioritization of the Black community's political interests over their own interests by referencing past actions in which their own personal well-being was jeopardized. Underlying this type of signal is a *realized accountability* that shows the politician has already placed the group's interest before his own. Congressman John Lewis's online biography, which highlights his past arrests, physical attacks, and injuries, conveys a realized accountability because it illustrates that he put himself in mortal danger in order to push for civil rights for the Black community.

Potential accountability is communicated through one's signaling of their connection to individuals, institutions, or symbols that have strong meanings to the racial group. Those politicians who signal a social connection convey the possibility of placing the group's interests first as well as an understanding of the possible sanctions should she or he deviate from group norms. In a 2016 interview, Senator Cory Booker was asked about what influenced his decision to become a leader, he responded saying, "My parents were active in the civil rights movement… I also grew up with family members who demonstrated to me courage, resilience and compassion for others." (Schwabel 2016). Booker's invocation of his parents' sacrifices suggests that he understands the importance of placing the group's interests first, and recognizes that he could be subject to social sanctions from his family should he deviate from the norms and expectations of social accountability. Thus, Booker uses these social connection signals to make clear, despite not having made sacrifices for the community, his connection to people who have is proof of his potential to place the group's interests above his own.

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
Figure 1. Community Commitment Signaling Framework

Methods

To test my arguments about the effect of different community commitment signals on candidate evaluations, I employ two original experimental tests in the context of a campaign where the candidate is vying for support from voters who know little about him. The use of a low information context creates a circumstance where subjects' evaluations of the candidate are based solely on the information provided to them, which enables me to observe how Blacks evaluate candidates based on information about their sacrifices for, or connections to, the racial group.

I test my theory in the context of Democratic primary elections in majority-minority Congressional districts where the race (Black) and partisanship (Democrat) of candidates are held constant. I intentionally selected a congressional election, as these are the types of national contests where we are likely to see Black candidates challenge one another in primary races. Most Black Congressional candidates come out of majority Black districts (Highton 2004; Lublin 2018), which means that in the primary contexts we can assume that Black voters are choosing between multiple descriptive representatives. Moreover, we can assume that these considerations are made at lower

levels of government (i.e., mayoral) in these districts as well. I procured an online quota sample of

self-identified Black individuals from Qualtrics.[4]

Sample [5]

Observations (N)	1150
Sex	
Male	575
Female	575
Average Party Identification	Democrat
Median Ideology	Slightly Liberal
Average Age	37 years old
Median Income	$40,000-49,999
Median Education Level	Some College

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Full Sample

Experimental Design

Inspiration for this experimental design comes from the 2001 Illinois's 1st Congressional

district election where political newcomer Barack Obama ran against incumbent, Representative

Bobby Rush. During the campaign, Rush exploited the drastically different approaches he and

Obama had to representing their co-racial constituents. One of the many critiques leveraged against

Obama by Rush was his connection to the "White-liberal establishment" by virtue of the White

wealthy base of voters he had and his Ivy League education (Kleine 2000).

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[4] Qualtrics, LLC is an internet survey firm.

[5] For Balance statistics and comparisons to the general Black population, please see Tables 1-2 in the

Appendix

The stimuli are embedded in a USA Today news article that focuses on a congressional race between two Black candidates, Reginald Washington and Tyrone Moseley.[6] In the article, Washington responds to an allegation from Moseley that he, Washington, is "part of the White - Democratic establishment." Once subjects finish reading the online newspaper article, they were asked to evaluate Reginald Washington on several dimensions.

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[6] The names chosen reflect the research of Frymer and Levitt (2004) that establishes that Reginald, Tyrone, and Kiara (seen in an experimental condition in Table 2) are traditionally Black names (770). More than half the people in the United States with the last names Washington and Moseley respectively, according to the 2010 Census, are Black.

Article Title: "Congressional Hopeful responds to Opponent's Slight."

Control	Social Ties – Wife	Social Ties – NAACP	Personal Sacrifice-Financial	Personal Sacrifice-Physical
(N=246)	(N=227)	(N=229)	(N=220)	(N=227)
"I've heard Mr. Moseley has said that I am 'part of the White establishment of the Democratic Party.' Such statements made to hurt my chances at election are further proof of the change in leadership Washington needs."	"I've heard Mr. Moseley has said that I am 'part of the White establishment of the Democratic Party,' **which shows that he clearly does not know my wife, Kyara, because if I had turned my back on Black people, she would have all the locks changed, and my things would be on the street.** Such statements made to hurt my chances at election are further proof of the change in leadership we need.	I've heard Mr. Moseley has said that I am 'part of the White establishment of the Democratic Party,' **which shows that he clearly does not know that I am backed by our local NAACP chapter. If I turned my back on Black people, they mostly certainly would not support me.** Such statements made to hurt my chances at election are further proof of the change in leadership we need."	"I've heard Mr. Moseley has said that I am 'part of the White establishment of the Democratic Party,' **which shows that he clearly does not know that I gave up my job at a prominent law firm to work as an attorney for numerous civil rights organizations. If I had turned my back on Black people, I would have remained in corporate America and collected my check.** Such statements made to hurt my chances at election are further proof of the change in leadership we need."	"I've heard Mr. Moseley has said that I am 'part of the White establishment of the Democratic Party,' **which shows that he clearly does not know that I have been hit with rubber bullets, tear gassed, and put in jail while fighting for equality. If I had turned my back on Black people, it would be an insult to all of those people for whom I fight."** Such statements made to hurt my chances at election are further proof of the change in leadership we need."

Table 2. Text of Reginald Washington's Statement Manipulation

   Within this experimental design, I operationalize the realized and potential accountability Reginald Washington conveys by varying how he signals community commitment in response to the claim that he is "part of the White Democratic establishment." Survey participants were randomly assigned into one of five experimental conditions- control condition, Social Connection- wife condition, Social Connection-NAACP condition, Personal Sacrifice Financial condition, and a Personal Sacrifice- Physical condition (see Table 1 for exact article language).

Motivation for the "Social Connection-wife" comes from Elsa Barkley Brown's (1997) research where she's provides examples of wives sanctioning their husbands for working against the Black community. She writes, "Women reportedly initiated sanctions against men who voted Democratic. One South Carolina witness reported that "'no mens were to go to the polls unless their wives were right alongside of them; some had hickory sticks; some had nails—four nails drive in the shape of a cross—and dare their husbands to vote any other than the Republican ticket'" (82). While this experimental condition is not exactly the same, it does invoke the same use of sanctions from the candidate's wife to ensure that he does not stray from behavior that benefits the Black community. This signal communicates Washington's potential accountability suggesting that he will place the group's interest first for fear of being sanctioned by his wife.

Many elected officials reference their association with organizations like the NAACP in order to show a connection to a prominent Black institution that was very involved in the Civil Rights Movement, and remains an important part of the push for Black socio-political inclusion. Like the other social connection experimental condition, the invocation of the NAACP's endorsement is a signal that suggests a candidate's potential accountability to place the group's interests before his own because it shows an understanding of the consequences that would occur, losing the NAACP's endorsement, should the candidate not prioritize Black people. Using a community commitment signal that draws on one's connection with the NAACP communicates a greater potential for accountability because organizations like the NAACP are known for the work they do on behalf of the Black community to bring about racial justice. Thus, *I expect that candidates who use the institutional social connection signal will receive more positive evaluations relative to the individual social connection condition (H1).*

Personal sacrifice signals can reference activities like participation in protests or marches, or when they choose the community's well-being over their own financial well-being, all of which were

associated with Civil Rights leaders (Chong 1999; Williams 2007). Thus, in the "Personal Sacrifice-Financial" experimental condition, Reginald Washington communicates realized accountability by explaining that he has put the interests of the racial group first by leaving a high paying job and working for civil rights organizations. Barack Obama's time as a community organizer in the South Side of Chicago serves as an example of a financial sacrifice. He earned approximately $10,000 a year during his time as an organizer, and worked in communities that were often underserved (Kovaleski 2008). This is an example of financial sacrifice because Obama could have taken a job earning more money, but instead he took a job that served the Black community of Chicago.[7] Many civil rights leaders made this kind of sacrifice, forsaking their jobs and revenue streams, and relying on the kindness of individuals and churches while they traveled around the South raising support for civil rights causes (Williams 2007).

Of all the signals tested, the "Personal Sacrifice- Physical" community commitment signal condition is probably the most easily identified as being similar to the acts of civil rights leaders. Indeed, those leaders were known for putting their lives in danger for the sake of attain equal rights. The realized accountability in this condition is displayed through the mention of past acts where the candidate's physical well-being was in harm's way. By using this kind of signal, the candidate shows that he has already put the group's interests first at the expense of his own physical safety for the sake of furthering the interests of the Black community. The ability to communicate a realized

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[7] It is important to note that I am not making an argument that the choices Obama made were genuine or without consideration of the potential political rewards. My argument is that these particular signals can communicate a realized accountability to Black voters and, regardless of the signalers intent, can influence the way the candidate is viewed by co-racial constituents.

accountability through actions similar to those made during the Civil Rights Movement, for which many Black people remain appreciative, inform my prediction *that Black voters will be more favorable to politicians who use personal sacrifice community commitment signals than a Black politician that does not use a community commitment signal (H2).* However, Black voters will distinguish between financial and physical sacrifices because physical sacrifices for the group will be seen as more costly. As a result, *I expect that the candidate who uses the physical sacrifice signal will be evaluated higher than the candidate who uses the financial sacrifice community commitment signal* (H2a).

Outcome Measures

Much of the literature on Black descriptive representation focuses on how having a descriptive representative affects how trustworthy, caring, helpful, the representative perceived to be (Tate 2004). Following this trend, and acknowledging that voters' vote choice is the last of the considerations made by voters, and heavily informed by affective evaluations of candidates (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995), I focus on three different affective measures of candidate evaluation to understand how messages that signal different kinds of social accountability affect those evaluations. To investigate how community commitment signals affect Black respondents' evaluations of candidates, I test their effect on the following outcome measures:

1. General Evaluation: Based on what you have read, do you like Reginald Wallace? Yes or No

2. Trustworthiness: How much do you think you can trust Reginald Wallace? The answer options were on a scale of 0-10, 0 being "Not at All" and 10 being "Very Much."

3. Perceived Genuineness: How genuine do you think Reginald Wallace is about addressing the interests that are important to the Black community? 0 being "Not at all Genuine" and 10 being "Very Genuine." With the answer options being on a scale of 0-10, 0 being "Not at Genuine" and 10 being "Very Genuine."

4. <u>Willingness to Support:</u> Based on the information you have heard, how willing would you be to support Reginald Wallace? On a scale of 0 to 10, 0 being "Not at All Willing" and 10 being "Very Willing."

It is important to note that the experimental designs presented in this paper are conservative tests of my theory. By controlling for the race, partisanship, and gender of the candidate in each condition, I am effectively removing the three main demographic influencers of Black political behavior (Tate 2004). Moreover, the changes between each condition are fairly small (no more than a sentence, see Table 1). With this in mind, one might expect to see little to no movement in the candidate's evaluations. Thus, any movement we do see, no matter the size, offers a first look at undiscussed nuances within Black political behavior.

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
Figure 2. The Effect of Experimental Conditions of Whether or Not Respondents like Reginald Washington

Note: Statistical significance is two-tailed and compared to the Control condition. * p<.05; ** p<.01

Figure 2 shows the proportion of individuals within each condition that liked or disliked the candidate based on the kind of community commitment signal he used. It offers a clear and concise picture of how community commitment signals influence the ways in which Black voters evaluate co-racial candidates. What is clear from Figure 2 is that respondents in the "Sacrifice-Physical" condition like Reginald Washington more than respondents in the control condition ($p<.01$) (H1a). Moreover, when the candidate discusses his physical sacrifice for the Black community's betterment, respondents like him more than those who were exposed to the candidate who spoke of his NAACP endorsement ($p<.05$) or the potential backlash from his wife ($p<.01$).

Additionally, respondents who read about the candidate's financial sacrifice for the racial group favored him more than those who read about the candidate who did not use a community commitment signal ($p<.05$), or who referenced his wife as a means to show connection to the racial group ($p<.05$). These results provide a clear indication that community commitment signals that use sacrifice, whether physical or financial, cause people to like Reginald Washington more than those in the control and other community commitment signal conditions. These findings do not provide support for H2, and suggests that community commitment signals that rely on social connections to the Black community do not lead to meaningful differences.

Figure 3. The Effect of Experimental Conditions of Respondents' Perceptions of Reginald Washington's Trustworthiness [8]

Tate's (2004) study finds that Black voters believe that Black representatives are more

trustworthy than non-Black representatives (also see Broockman 2014). By showing how different

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[8] The results in Figures 3-5 present the coefficients from an Ordinary Least Square Regression.

Statistical significance is compared to the Control condition (represented by the dashed vertical line).

All dependent variables scaled from 0-1. Confidence intervals that do not touch the dashed line

indicate statistical significance. The greater the distance, the greater the statistical significance. The

model controls for age, education level, sex, Southern residence, partisanship, racial identity salience,

linked fate, ideology, and income. See Appendix for Tables 5-10 of models with and without

controls as well the Average Experimental Effects for each of the dependent variables.

signals vary Black respondents' perceptions of trust, Figure 3 offers a more nuanced understanding of what factors Blacks take into account when assessing a candidate's trustworthiness. Most notably, the Black candidate in the physical sacrifice is perceived to be the most trustworthy - yielding a differences between both sacrifice conditions ($p<.01$) followed by financial sacrifice community commitment signal condition ($p<.05$) relative to the control condition (H1). Additionally, when Reginald Washington replies to his opponent's slight against his connection and commitment to the community by citing that the local NAACP chapter backs him, he is perceived to be more trustworthy ($p < 0.01$) relative to the control condition. Washington's reference of his wife as a means to hold him accountable to the Black community led him to be seen as less trustworthy than all other signals ($p<.01$ for each). Black candidates trustworthiness is not inherently assumed by Black voters, and certain signals can change the way that Black voters view descriptive representatives. Signals of sacrifice to the group, particularly those of a physical nature which communicate a realized accountability offer a mechanism by which we can understand why certain Black politicians are seen as more trustworthy than others.

Figure 4. The Effect of Experimental Conditions of Respondents' Perceptions of Reginald Washington's Genuineness in Addressing the Black Community's Issues

Within the literature on Black descriptive representation, Tate (2004) says that many Black individuals believe same race candidates "[care] more about working on behalf of their constituents" (122). I contend that Tate's findings, while compelling, could lead some to assume that Black individuals perceive that all Black politicians, regardless of if and how they show a connection to the Black community, care equally about that Black community's interests. If those assumptions hold, we should see no meaningful variation in whether respondents believe that Reginald Washington is genuine in addressing the concerns of the Black community. However, the results in Figure 4 do not affirm that assumption, instead showing that, on average, those who read about Reginald Washington's physical sacrifice believed him to be the most genuine in addressing the Black community's interests when compared to his statement in the control condition ($p<.05$) where no community commitment signal was conveyed (H1a). This finding demonstrates that when a Black candidate highlights his/her physical sacrifices on behalf of the racial group it causes Black

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individuals to see the candidate as more caring of the Black community. Those who read about Washington's connection to the NAACP and how the organization would not support him if he turned his back on Black people also led respondents to see his concerns for the Black community as genuine relative to those in the control condition (p<.05).

Also, worth mentioning is how those individuals who read about the potential backlash Washington would face from his wife, Kyara, were he to turn his back on the Black community did not see his concern as genuine. Indeed, relative to signals of physical sacrifice and the NAACP's endorsement, respondents' perceptions of the candidate's genuineness when referencing his wife are markedly lower (p<.01 for both). These findings suggest that signaling his wife may be seen as pandering and not taken to be a reliable indication of one's accountability to the racial group. Perhaps there needs to be more information about the candidate's wife in order to make the use of her as an accountability structure seem less disingenuous.

Finding an almost equal effect for respondents in the "Social Connection- NAACP" condition provides the first indication of how political candidates who cannot or do not draw on their signals of sacrifice can signal their connection to the Black community through an organization like the NAACP to convey accountability. Figure 4 shows that Black voters recognize the strategic value of some signals and discount Black politicians appropriately. Their determinations go beyond whether they like a candidate and go into whether they believe his appeal is genuine, which has implications for how helpful and trustworthy they might find him.

Figure 5. The Effect of Experimental Conditions of Respondents' Willingness to Support Reginald Washington

Consistent with other findings, Figure 5 shows that when Reginald Washington signaled his physical sacrifice for the Black community, Black respondents were more willing to support him relative to the condition where he signals no commitment to the Black community ($p<0.01$) (H1a). Again, we see that Black individuals respond more favorably when Black politicians invoke sacrifice on behalf of the group. The difference between the control and physical sacrifice conditions supports my claim that Black people make distinctions between the kinds of signals that Black politicians send. Rewarding a Black candidate who has sacrificed for the betterment of the group is also apparent when examining the difference in willingness to support between the control condition and the "Sacrifice-Financial" condition ($p<0.05$). However, for those candidates who are unable to signal any form of sacrifice, we also see that discussing one's connection to an organization known for helping the Black community like the NAACP leads to a significant increase

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in the willingness to support Reginald Washington (p<0.05) relative to the control. This difference highlights that this particular kind of social connection does lead to a substantively meaningful increase. However, as with the other outcomes, referencing a personal connection to the racial group through his wife led respondents in the physical sacrifice (p<.01), financial sacrifice (p<.05), and the NAACP endorsement (p<.05) conditions to be less willing to support Reginald Washington.

It appears that when evaluating Black candidates, Black voters make little distinctions between signals of sacrifice, but do see important differences in the social connections descriptive representatives invoke to communicate the potential accountability. This evidence is suggestive that signals that communicate a realized accountability to the racial group are evaluated with less scrutiny because candidates have proven their willingness to place the group's interest above their own, thus it may be easier for Blacks to believe the candidate will continue to behave in this way once elected. Those candidates who seek to show a potential accountability through signals of social connection, however, have more to prove and thus some signals are not as effective. The findings about social connection signals offer strong evidence that seeking to show accountability to the racial group is more effective with signals of institutional connection rather than individual.

Experiment 2- White Candidate Replication

The results of the first experimental test show that Black voters make distinctions about descriptive representatives based on their perceptions of their accountability to the Black community. However, I contend that this effect is not solely intra-racial, but allows us to see social accountability's influence in the distinctions made by Black voters more clearly. Political contexts, like Democratic primaries in majority-minority districts, that control for salient predictors of candidate selection like race, partisanship, and gender (in some cases) help to isolate the effect of perceptions of a candidate's accountability.

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Like their Black counterparts, many White politicians at different levels of elected office have to appeal to the Black community. They employ similar strategies to do so. For example, during his 2016 presidential campaign, photographs of Bernie Sander's 1963 arrest during a protest against segregation surfaced and "bolster[ed] the candidate's narrative about his civil rights activism" (Skiba 2016). Additionally, many Blacks saw New York City Mayor Bill deBlasio's Black family members as a signal that he would be able to understand their perspectives and experiences. In particular, people valued his wife, Chirlain McCray, saying, "'You have a Black woman sitting there who can say, 'My side of the family is hurting over here, now.' He's going to hear that direct… He's not going to get it from somebody off the street he has no relationship with" (Grynbaum 2013). Finally, the electoral success of Memphis Congressman Steve Cohen, a White, Jewish, Memphis native who has, through endorsements of prominent Black figures within the Congressional Black Caucus, maintained support amongst his Black constituents despite running against numerous viable Black opponents (Brown 2009). His success serves as another example of how signals to the Black community are not solely employed by Black politicians.

To prove that the desire for social accountability exists outside of an electoral context in which two Black candidates run against one another, I run a second, similar experiment with White candidates. If, as I theorize, the mechanism underlying preferences for descriptive representatives is truly perceptions of social accountability and not shared life experience, then the signals should be able to work for White candidates. As such, I expect that Black voters will prefer White candidates who signal a willingness to place the Black community's interests above their own interest.

Methods

This study is similar to the first experiment with some slight alterations for the sake of validity. The first change is the candidate's last name from Washington to Wallace[9], and the second is the slight leveraged against him by Tyrone Moseley. In this experiment, instead of responding to being called a member of the "White Democratic establishment," Wallace addresses the allegation that he "cannot represent the interests of the community." [10] The experimental manipulation is in Wallace's response to his opponent's claim. I operationalize the realized and potential accountability mechanisms discussed in the community commitment framework by varying the signals Wallace uses to refute the claims made by Moseley.

The experimental design change was made from the first experiment because the slight that Wallace is "part of the White Democratic establishment" is a moot point considering he is White. The effect of that particular slight would not carry the same weight, if any, as it did when leveraged against a Black candidate. Instead, I looked to the Congressional race in Memphis, TN where W.W. Herenton ran against Steve Cohen, and leveraged the racial differences as an explanation for why Cohen was unfit to represent the interests of Memphis's Black population. Also, the photograph

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[9] The change in the candidate's last name was for believability. According to the 2010 Census, approximately 87.5% of the individuals with the last name of "Washington" are African American. In order to ensure no doubt was cast about the White candidate I changed the last name to Wallace, and, according to the 2010 Census, approximately 69% of individuals with this last name are White.

used in the experiment is of a White man. All other aspects of this experiment are identical to the

first.

Sample

Observations (N)	1150
Sex	
Male	575
Female	575
Median Party Identification	Democrat
Median Ideology	Slightly Liberal
Average Age	38 years old
Median Income	$40,000-49,999
Median Education Level	Some College

Table 3. Demographic Characteristics of Full Sample

Figure 6. The Proportional Effect of Experimental Conditions of Whether or Not Respondents like Reginald Wallace

Note: Statistical significance is two-tailed and compared to the Control condition. * p<.05; ** p<.01

Figure 7. The Effect of Experimental Conditions of Respondents' Perceptions of Reginald Wallace's Trustworthiness

Note for Figures 7-9: The results in Figures 3-5 present the coefficients from an Ordinary Least Square Regression. Statistical significance is compared to the Control condition (represented by the dashed vertical line). Confidence intervals that do not touch the dashed line indicate statistical significance. The greater the distance, the greater the statistical significance. All dependent variables scaled from 0-1.

The model controls for respondents' age, education level, sex, Southern residence, partisanship, racial identity salience, linked fate, ideology, and income. See Appendix for tables of models with and without controls.

Figure 8. The Effect of Experimental Conditions of Respondents' Perceptions of Reginald Wallace's Genuineness in Addressing the Black Community's Issues

Figure 9. The Effect of Experimental Conditions of Respondents' Willingness to Support Reginald Wallace

Figures 6-9 show how Black respondents' evaluations of the White candidate, Reginald Wallace, based on the kind of community commitment signal he used, and offers a clear and concise picture of how community commitment signals influence the ways in which that Black voters evaluate candidates seeking to connect with Black voters. A clear picture emerges that respondents in the "Sacrifice-Physical" condition view Reginald Wallace more positively than respondents in the control condition (H1a). Additionally, in Figures 7 and 9, respondents who read about the candidate's financial sacrifice for the racial group liked him compared to those who read about the candidate who did not use a community commitment signal. These results provide a clear indication that community commitment signals that reference personal sacrifices, whether physical or financial, lead to more people seeing Reginald Wallace as likeable, trustworthy, genuine, and worthy of support relative to the control condition.

Moreover, these findings suggest that community commitment signals that rely on social connections to the Black community are not consistent in their ability to lead Black individuals to positively evaluate White candidates relative to the control condition. Interestingly, unlike in Experiment 1, Wallace's discussion of social connection to his wife Kyara led to him being seen as more trustworthy when compared to those who read his statement that did not include a community commitment signal (p≤.05). For the White candidate, it appears that for some Black individuals, a White representative being married to a Black woman suggests a stronger understanding of and connection to the Black community, and thus Wallace is seen as more trustworthy than someone without that connection. This particular finding makes it clear that while the effect of personal sacrifice on Black voters leads to similar candidate evaluations regardless of the candidate's race, the effect of social connection signals is contingent upon whether the candidate is White or Black.

Discussion

  Within the study of democratic representation there has been little exploration into the salient factors, outside of partisanship and race, that influence the way that individuals, particularly those communities with histories of political exclusion, choose their descriptive representatives. Understanding the criterion citizens use to include or exclude certain representatives informs whether and how democratic institutions operate fairly. More specifically, descriptive representation is a politically potent form of representation that leads to meaningful changes in the behavior of citizens (Bobo and Gilliam 1999; Tate 2004; Griffin and Keene 2006; Stout 2015; Sanbonmatsu 2003; Celis and Childs 2008; Rosenthal 1995; Alexander 2012; Schildkraut 2013; Wallace 2014; Broockman 2014; Casellas and Wallace 2015). Though many scholars show the importance of descriptive representation, understanding questions about how certain descriptive representatives, are chosen over others and the political implications of those choices, remain.

  In this article, I shine light on what makes Black voters prefer certain representatives over others. By offering a novel theoretical framework, and employing two experimental tests I establish that social accountability is the causal mechanism Blacks use to establish a politician's preferability, and replicate that finding in a second experiment using a White candidate. Specifically, I varied the kind of signal candidates used to show their social accountability, or willingness to place the group's political interests above their own individual interests. The results show, across both experiments and numerous outcome variables, signaling one's physical sacrifice for the racial group is the most optimal manifestation of social accountability, and led respondents, on average, to reward the candidate the highest evaluations relative to when he did not signal any community commitment. The consistency in this finding across two experimental tests, and candidates of different races, suggests that Black voters prefer representatives whose actions mirrors that of civil rights politicians, and whose accountability to the racial group has already been proven by way of sacrifices,

particularly of a physical nature. Given the numerous social and institutional impediments Black Americans, a powerful voting bloc within the American electorate, face in their attempts to gain and maintain socio-political equality, understanding the social structures in place to ensure representatives who will work to further the interests of the group is important.

While the two experiments do yield important similarities that speak to a general behavior amongst Black Americans, there are meaningful differences in how they assess the signals from Black and White candidates that have implications for the kinds of candidates who can garner Black support. These differences manifest most notably when candidates who signal social connection to convey potential for placing the group's interests first. Generally, signals of community commitment led to an increase in affective evaluations and certain political evaluations, when Reginald Washington (the Black candidate) referenced his wife Kyara as an accountability mechanism, he received evaluations that were almost equal to or lower than when he did not signal commitment at all. Why this signal was not effective requires further investigation, but these results suggest that invoking one's spouse or family member as a potential accountability structure might be insufficient to show one's adherence to the norms of the group. However, this finding does not translate when the candidate is White.

Indeed, when presented with the White candidate, Reginald Wallace, respondents who read about his wife, Kyara, were more inclined to see him as more genuine and more willing to support him relative to the control. This finding makes it clear that individual or personal connections to the racial group operate differently for out-group candidates. I suspect that Black candidates are expected to know the norms of the group thus reliance on one's wife or personal contact to enforce the norms casts more doubt on their ability to adequately address the political issues of the group. White candidates, however, are held to the opposite expectation, and thus a connection to someone

who can inform and enforce the social accountability norms of the racial group serves as a better indicator of one's ability to further the group's interests.

Interestingly, the reactions from those participants randomly placed into the NAACP experimental condition also varied based on the race of the candidate. The results in the first experiment provide some preliminary insights into how Black politicians can be seen positively and subsequently gain support from Black voters without communicating a realized accountability. Unlike the invocation of his wife, Reginald Washington's connection to the NAACP, an organization known for its work on behalf of the Black community, serves as a potent signal of his potential to be held accountable to the group. In fact, many respondents gave him comparable evaluations to those who were exposed to the personal sacrifice signals suggesting that when one's accountability is being enforced by a prominent organization known for its role in fighting for the rights of the group, Blacks are more likely to perceive stronger levels of accountability. This finding is not the case for the White candidate, Reginald Wallace. When he responds with discussions of his NAACP endorsement, Black respondents did not consistently evaluate him positively suggesting that for White candidates having a more personal connection is more important than an institutional one while the opposite is true for Black candidates.

Broadly, these results show social accountability is the mechanism that explains why some descriptive representatives are preferred while some are not, and meaningful empirical support for the need to consider the nuances of Black voters' support for descriptive representation. Despite the pervasive findings in descriptive representation work which suggests that Black Americans display meaningful changes in their political behaviors and attitudes when they have any descriptive representative, the results presented here make it clear that all descriptive representatives are not treated the same. Using their historical exclusion and strong social cohesion as a foundation for their political considerations, Blacks have a sophisticated screening mechanism born out of their specific

history that they use to ensure that the descriptive representatives they put into office are ones that will further the interests of the group.

Studying variation in Black Americans' assessments of co-racial politicians presents a highly conservative test of my theoretical framework that, when coupled with two conservative experimental tests, offers important insights for how scholars in future research might approach similar questions for other identity groups. If finding meaningful variation in how descriptive representatives are viewed and evaluated is possible for a population that displays high levels of political and identity cohesion, we should expect it to be found in groups that have more variation in their identity salience and partisanship like women or Latinx populations. This work offers the first look at the mechanisms that explains how the source of the expectations leveraged against descriptive representatives informs how certain representatives gain success, and offers a road map for future scholars to consider when applying to other groups.

Conclusion

Though future research should explore the generalizability of these findings for other groups, this piece offers strong evidence of a mechanism beyond the traditionally employed ones like party (and policy by proxy) and skin color to explain how voters choose their representatives has for our understandings of the descriptive representation model. At its most basic level, the community commitment signaling framework affirms that some people respond positively to costly signals (Connelly et al. 2011). Thus, if preference is given to a descriptive representative who references sacrifices she has made for the group to appeal to voters, one could claim that doing something costly will yield more positive evaluations for the candidate. However, the fuller contribution of my framework is that it draws on the socio-historical narratives of the group to provide a mechanism that explains why certain signals, costly or otherwise, resonate with voters in particular ways. In other words, in order to optimize the community commitment signaling

framework's explanatory power, it is best applied to groups whose histories offer a strong indication of what voters will expect from same-identity representatives, and what kinds of signals will be most effective to communicate an understanding of those expectations.

At its root, descriptive representation was meant to be about representatives who understand the needs of their constituents because of a similarity in lived experiences, not necessarily on the basis of a physically identifiable characteristic. And indeed if we consider the example Phillips Griffiths (1960) provides where he describes himself as a descriptive representative because he is "sufficiently like his fellows for someone to be reasonably safe in drawing conclusions about the other members of [his] generation from what they know of [him]," we see that the similarity is one that potentially cuts across many different identities.

This article expands understandings of descriptive representation because the mechanism of social accountability does not rely on the physical characteristics of the representatives or even similar lived experiences as necessary and sufficient tenets of their ability to represent the interests of a set of constituents. It delves deeper into the group's norms and expectations to find the glue behind the group's consciousness and applies that to the representative/constituent relationship. To be sure, sharing the physical similarities of one's constituents may contribute to perceptions of one's ability, but, as shown here, it is not sufficient to meet the expectations of voters. Future research should not solely rely on the existing explanations for the success of descriptive representatives, but should continue to investigate the descriptive representative/constituent relationship to understand how certain representatives in office got there.

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Appendix

Table 1. Balance Statistics by Experimental Conditions for Experiment #1: Black Candidate

	Control	Social Ties-Wife	Social Ties-NAACP	Personal Sacrifice-Financial	Personal Sacrifice-Physical
	Experimental Conditions				
Age	37.0	38.0	36.8	36.3	36.6
% Female	52%	48.5%	49%	50%	49.8%
Education	Some College	Some College	Some College	Some College	Some College
Ideology	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal
Partisanship	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat
Income	$40,000-$49,000	$40,000- $49,000	$40,000- $49,000	$40,000- $49,000	$40,000- $49,000
% From South	49.6%	48.9%	47.2%	49.1%	41%*

Note: *$p<.05$; There are less people from the South in the Physical Sacrifice condition.

**Table 2. Balance Statistics by Experimental Conditions for Experiment #2:
White Candidate**

	Control	Social Ties-Wife	Social Ties-NAACP	Personal Sacrifice-Financial	Personal Sacrifice-Physical
	Experimental Conditions				
Age	38.0	39.3	36.8	38.3	40.0
% Female	47%	52%	49%	52%	50%
Education	Some College	Some College	Some College	Some College	Some College
Ideology	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal
Partisanship	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Democrat
Income	$30,000- $39,000	$40,000- $49,000	$40,000- $49,000	$40,000-$49,000	$40,000-$49,000
% From South	50%	55%	47%	50%	49%

Table 3. <u>Summary Statistics for Experiments 1 & 2 with Black Population Comparisons</u>

	Experiment #1 Black Candidate Qualtrics Sample	Experiment #2 White Candidate Qualtrics Sample	Black Population
Observations (N)	1150	1150	-
Male	575	575	-
Female	575	575	-
Party Identification Percentage of Sample (95% CIs)	**Democrat** 0.68 (0.65, 0.71) **Republican** 0.06 (0.05, 0.08) **Independent** 0.26 (0.23, 0.28)	**Democrat** 0.67 (0.64, 0.70) **Republican** 0.07 (0.06, 0.09) **Independent** 0.26 (0.23, 0.28)	**Democrat** 0.70 (0.66, .74) **Republican** 0.04 (0.03, 0.06) **Independent** 0.22 (0.18, 0.26)
Median Ideology	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Slightly Liberal
Median Income	$40,000-49,999	$40,000-49,999	$40,258
Education Level	Proportion w/ Bachelor's Degree or more: 0.312 (0.29, 0.34)	Proportion w/Bachelor's Degree of more: 0.24 (0.22, 0.28)	22.5% w/ Bachelor's Degree or more

Note: Cell entries report summaries of the Qualtrics samples of Black respondents and comparisons to the Black population. Data sources for the Black population estimates are the U.S. Census Bureau (income, education) and the 2016 American National Election Study black oversample (ideology, party).

CORRESPONDING RESULT TABLES FOR FIGURES IN MANUSCRIPT

Table 4. Proportions for Respondents' Like or Dislike of the Candidate

	Experiment #1			Experiment #2		
	Black Candidate			White Candidate		
	Like	**Dislike**	**Difference Relative to Control**	**Like**	**Dislike**	**Difference Relative to Control**
Control	.61	.39		.49	.51	
Social Connection-Wife	.60	.40		.56	.43	
Social Connection-NAACP	.63	.37		.58	.42	p<.05
Personal Sacrifice-Financial	.70	.30	p<.05	.64	.36	p<.01
Personal Sacrifice-Physical	.72	.28	p<.01	.65	.25	p<.01

Note: The two experimental samples, though highly comparable were collected at different times thus the results cannot be compared in any statistically meaningful way, but do offer insights into how the different experimental treatments operated when the candidate was white versus when we was black.

Table 5. Experimental Effects on Perceptions of Trustworthiness
(Baseline- Control Condition)

	Experiment #1		Experiment #2	
	Black Candidate		**White Candidate**	
	Without Controls	**With Controls**	**Without Controls**	**With Controls**
Social Connection-Wife	0.01	0.01	**0.05***	**0.06***
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*
Social Connection-NAACP	**.08****	**.08****	.03	.04
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*
Personal Sacrifice-Financial	**.09****	**.09****	**.07****	**.07****
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*
Personal Sacrifice-Physical	**.09****	**.09****	**.07****	**.07****
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*
Age	___	.00	___	.00
		(.00)		*(.00)*
Education Level	___	.00	___	-.01
		(.01)		*(.01)*
Male	___	-.01	___	**.04***
		(.01)		*(.01)*
South	___	-.00	___	.00
		(.01)		*(.01)*
Partisanship	___	.04	___	-.03
		(.03)		*(.03)*
Social Identity (Race) Salience	___	**.11****	___	**.10***
		(.04)		*(.04)*
Linked Fate	___	.03	___	**.05***
		(.02)		*(.02)*
Ideology	___	.03	___	.01
		(.03)		*(.03)*
Income	___	**.01***	___	.00
		(.00)		*(.00)*
Constant	**.55****	**.36****	**.51****	**.44****
	(.02)	*(.06)*	*(.02)*	*(.07)*
N	1,149	1,149	1,150	1,149
R^2	.03	.06	.009	.03

Note: ** $p<0.01$; * $p<0.05$.

Table 6. Average Experimental Effect on Perceptions of the Candidate's Trustworthiness

	Experiment #1	Experiment #2
	Black Candidate	**White Candidate**
Control	0.55	0.51
	(0.52, 0.58)	(0.48, 0.55)
Social Connection-Wife	0.56	0.57
	(0.53, 0.59)	(0.53, 0.60)
Social Connection-NAACP	**0.63****	0.54
	(0.60, 0.66)	(0.51, 0.57)
Personal Sacrifice-Financial	**0.64****	**0.58****
	(0.61, 0.67)	(0.55, 0.61)
Personal Sacrifice-Physical	**0.64****	**0.58****
	(0.61, 0.67)	(0.55, 0.61)

Note: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. All statistical significance is two tailed with 95% CIs and relative to the Control condition. The two experimental samples, though highly comparable were collected at different times thus not appropriate for comparison.

Table 7. Experimental Effects on Perceptions Genuineness
(Baseline- Control Condition)

	Experiment #1		Experiment #2	
	Black Candidate		**White Candidate**	
	Without Controls	**With Controls**	**Without Controls**	**With Controls**
Social Connection-Wife	-.01 *(.02)*	-.01 *(.02)*	.04 *(.03)*	.04 *(.03)*
Social Connection-NAACP	**.05*** *(.02)*	**.05*** *(.02)*	.03 *(.02)*	.03 *(.02)*
Personal Sacrifice-Financial	.04 *(.02)*	.04 *(.02)*	.04 *(.02)*	.05 *(.02)*
Personal Sacrifice-Physical	**.05*** *(.02)*	**.05**** *(.02)*	**.07**** *(.02)*	**.07**** *(.02)*
Age	___	.00 *(.00)*	___	.00 *(.00)*
Education Level	___	-.00 *(.01)*	___	-.00 *(.01)*
Male	___	-.01 *(.01)*	___	**.03*** *(.01)*
South	___	-.02 *(.01)*	___	.01 *(.02)*
Partisanship	___	.04 *(.03)*	___	-.03 *(.03)*
Social Identity (Race) Salience	___	**.15**** *(.04)*	___	**.09*** *(.04)*
Linked Fate	___	.02 *(.02)*	___	.04 *(.02)*
Ideology	___	.03 *(.03)*	___	.02 *(.03)*
Income	___	.00 *(.00)*	___	.00 *(.00)*
Constant	**.57**** *(.02)*	**.39**** *(.07)*	**.50**** *(.02)*	**.41**** *(.07)*
N	1,149	1,149	1,150	1,149
R^2	.01	.04	.01	.02

Note: ** $p<0.01$; * $p<0.05$.

Table 8. Average Experimental Effect on Perceptions of the Candidate's Genuineness

	Experiment #1	Experiment #2
	Black Candidate	**White Candidate**
Control	0.57	0.50
	(0.53, 0.60)	(0.47, .0.54)
Social Connection-Wife	0.55	0.54
	(0.52, 0.59)	(0.51, 0.58)
Social Connection-NAACP	**0.61***	0.53
	(0.58, 0.65)	(0.50, 0.57)
Personal Sacrifice-Financial	0.60	0.55
	(0.57, 0.64)	(0.51, 0.58)
Personal Sacrifice-Physical	**0.62***	**0.57****
	(0.59, 0.65)	(0.54, 0.60)

Note: ** $p<0.01$; * $p<0.05$. All statistical significance is two tailed with 95% CIs and relative to the Control condition. The two experimental samples, though highly comparable were collected at different times thus not appropriate for comparison.

Table 9. Experimental Effects on Respondents' Willingness to Support
(Baseline- Control Condition)

	Experiment #1 Black Candidate		Experiment #2 White Candidate	
Social Connection-Wife	-.00	-.00	.05	.05
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*
Social Connection-NAACP	.05	**.05***	.04	.05
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*
Personal Sacrifice-Financial	**.06***	**.06***	**.06***	**.07***
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*
Personal Sacrifice-Physical	**.08***	**.08****	**.08****	**.08****
	(.02)	*(.02)*	*(.03)*	*(.02)*
Age	___	.00	___	-.00
		(.00)		*(.00)*
Education Level	___	.00	___	-.00
		(.01)		*(.01)*
Male	___	.00	___	**.05****
		(.02)		*(.02)*
South	___	.00	___	.02
		(.02)		*(.02)*
Partisanship	___	**.09****	___	-.05
		(.03)		*(.03)*
Social Identity (Race) Salience	___	**.15****	___	**.09***
		(.04)		*(.04)*
Linked Fate	___	.03	___	**.05***
		(.02)		*(.02)*
Ideology	___	**.07***	___	.02
		(.03)		*(.03)*
Income	___	.00	___	.01
		(.00)		*(.00)*
Constant	**.50****	**.21****	**.47****	**.34****
	(.02)	*(.07)*	*(.02)*	*(.07)*
N	1,149	1,149	1,150	1,149
R²	.01	.07	.008	.03

Note: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.

Table 10. Average Experimental Effect on Respondent's Willingness to Support the Candidate

	Experiment #1	Experiment #2
	Black Candidate	**White Candidate**
Control	0.53 (0.47, 0.54)	0.47 (0.43, .51)
Social Connection-Wife	0.50 (0.47, 0.53)	0.52 (0.48, 0.56)
Social Connection-NAACP	0.55 (0.52, 0.60)	0.51 (0.48, .055)
Personal Sacrifice-Financial	**0.56*** (0.52, 0.60)	**0.53*** (0.49, 0.57)
Personal Sacrifice-Physical	**0.58**** (0.55, 0.62)	**0.55**** (0.51, 0.58)

Note: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. All statistical significance is two tailed with 95% CIs and relative to the Control condition. The two experimental samples, though highly comparable were collected at different times thus not appropriate for comparison.